My domain got abused on GitHub Pages

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TLDR

  • A wildcard DNS record pointing immersivepoints.com to GitHub Pages let anonymous actors spin up scam subdomains like kafka.immersivepoints.com without any verification.

Key Takeaways

  • GitHub resolves any domain for any repo with a matching CNAME file, so a wildcard DNS entry exposes all subdomains to hijacking by strangers.
  • The abuse came from a private GitHub repository, making it impossible to flag or identify the specific repo.
  • Tools like can-i-take-over-xyz on GitHub already enumerate domains vulnerable to this subdomain takeover pattern.
  • GitHub does offer domain verification via a TXT record in account settings, but the feature is buried and no warning appears at the repository level if it is skipped.
  • The author only discovered the abuse because Google Search Console sent a new-owner alert; without it, the scam subdomains would have gone unnoticed.

Hacker News Comment Review

  • Commenters agree the root fix belongs on GitHub’s side: require domain owners to add a verification TXT record before any repo can claim a subdomain, mirroring how other platforms handle DNS ownership proof.

Original | Discuss on HN